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INTRODUCTION
Over 160,000 individuals in Tennessee are living in or near poverty
and are uninsured because they do not qualify for Medicaid and cannot
afford to buy insurance on their own.1 These individuals bear witness to a
broken Medicaid program that is an artifact of historical judgments about
the “deserving poor.”2 Medicaid has traditionally provided health care
coverage only to certain categories of individuals living in poverty.
Attempting to right this wrong, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (the “Affordable Care Act” or “ACA”) expanded Medicaid eligibility
to essentially all individuals who fall at or below 133 percent of the federal
poverty line. However, the Supreme Court’s decision in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB v. Sebelius)3
unwound this federal remedy by making the Medicaid expansion optional
for the states.
In the wake of this decision, two options have emerged for states
seeking to provide health care to the poor and uninsured, and more—
specifically individuals at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty line.
The first option is for a state to accept the Medicaid expansion in
accordance with the terms of the ACA. With this choice, a state would
receive full federal funding for the program for the first three years, and no
less than ninety percent funding after that point. The second option is for a
state to apply for a waiver from the federal government to use federal
Medicaid funds for premium subsidies that would enable the Medicaid
expansion population to buy commercial insurance. Both options
demonstrate an exemplar of cooperative governance—enabling the shared
1. The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States That Do Not Expand
Medicaid, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., 5 (Oct. 23, 2013), http://kff.org/healthreform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-expandmedicaid/.
2. Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into
Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (2013), available at http://www.bu.edu/law/central/
jd/organizations/journals/bulr/volume92n4/documents/OUTTERSON.pdf.
3. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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goal of providing health care coverage for those in need to be achieved
through federal funding and state flexibility. However, the waiver programs
are subject to important limitations, namely, a waiver program must still
promote the central goals of Medicaid.
On March 27, 2013, in an address to the Tennessee General
Assembly, Governor Bill Haslam announced a proposed plan (the
“Tennessee Plan”) to pursue the second option for addressing the existing
gap in Medicaid coverage.4 In lieu of expanding Medicaid eligibility
through the route envisioned by the ACA, Governor Haslam proposed the
Tennessee Plan, which would employ a federal waiver to direct federal
Medicaid funds toward providing premium subsidies for low income
Tennesseans. These premium subsidies would enable individuals in the
Medicaid expansion population to purchase private coverage on the newly
created health insurance marketplace.5
This Article will examine these aspects of the Tennessee Plan in
order to make the argument that Tennessee must either accept the Medicaid
expansion as codified in the Affordable Care Act, or make modifications to
the Tennessee Plan that better comport with the federal waiver program, the
central goals of Medicaid, the United States Constitution, and the spirit of
cooperative federalism.
PART I. NFIB V. SEBELIUS: THE IMPACT
OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION
To put the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius into
context, Part I of this Article contains two sections. Section A provides a
brief background of the Medicaid program and the changes that the ACA,
in its original form, attempted to incorporate. Section B analyzes the
Supreme Court’s reasoning and the impact of the decision.
A. Background of Medicaid before the ACA
The Social Security Act of 1965 introduced the federal health care
programs Medicare and Medicaid.6 In general, Medicare is a social
insurance program with benefits available to disabled individuals and the
elderly without regard to their means. Medicaid, on the other hand, has
developed into a type of welfare program for eligible recipients who meet a
threshold economic need and are within a category of people deemed to be
worthy of receiving aid. When originally passed by Congress, Medicaid
covered specific populations that fell within conventional notions of the
4. Haslam Unveils ‘Tennessee Plan’ for Health Care Reform, TN.GOV (Mar. 27,
2013, 9:51 AM), https://news.tn.gov/node/10458.
5. Id.
6. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1)).
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“deserving poor,”7 including the aged, blind, and permanently and totally
disabled. The program also covered dependent children and their relative
caretakers below specified poverty levels.8 By the 1980s, Medicaid was
expanded to cover additional low-income children and pregnant women.9
These rigid categories left many low-income individuals without access to
Medicaid, most notably low-income, non-disabled, single adults.
Though states can choose to cover additional populations, federal
matching dollars are only available for the mandatory eligibility categories
established by Congress. This dichotomy of state programmatic flexibility
and federal financial constraint is an artifact of the very structure of
Medicaid. The Medicaid program is an example of cooperative federalism,
wherein the federal government provides a significant portion of federal
funds for a specified program that is then implemented by the states.10
Every state administers its own Medicaid program with joint funding from
the federal government.11 Cooperative federalism is reflective of three
attributes of the United States’ republican form of government: (1) state and
federal governments share some common goals, including the goal of
“promot[ing] the general welfare” of citizens;12 (2) the “power to lay and
collect taxes”13 affords the federal government greater ability to finance
programs that will realize shared goals; and (3) there are differences among
the states that warrant some independence and flexibility in implementing
these programs.14
Seeking to provide coverage for all individuals living in poverty,
the ACA established an income-based category that would have been
mandatory in all states. Instead of eligibility dependent on both economic
and categorical need, eligibility would been determined on means alone.15
As drafted, the ACA required all states to expand their Medicaid programs
to include this population, and states were offered 100 percent funding
initially and dropping to 90 percent by 2020 to expand the Medicaid
population. To the extent the state did not accept the funding to expand the
Medicaid population, the Secretary for the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) had the discretion to withdraw all federal
Medicaid funds from a state, including funding for non-expansion, pre7. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 13.
8. Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981).
9. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 23.
10. See, e.g., Wis. Dep’t of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495
(2002) (stating that Medicaid “is designed to advance cooperative federalism”).
11. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 17–18.
12. U.S. Const. pmbl; see, e.g., Tenn. Const. art. I, § 2 (stating that government is
“instituted for the common benefit”).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
14. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative
Federalism, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 663, 669 (2001) (explaining that cooperative federalism
provides states significant discretion in administering policies).
15. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2582.
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ACA Medicaid populations. States opposing the Medicaid expansion, as
well as other provisions of the ACA, brought suit, leading to the Supreme
Court’s grant of certiorari in NFIB v. Sebelius.16
B. Supreme Court Passing the Choice of Expansion to the States
On the last day of the 2012 term, the Supreme Court finally issued
its ruling in one of the most watched cases of the year, NFIB v. Sebelius.17
Earlier that spring, the Court heard a nearly unprecedented six hours of oral
argument18 related to four legal challenges raised against the health care
law: the applicability of the Anti-Injunction Act; the constitutionality of the
individual mandate; the severability of the Affordable Care Act should the
individual mandate be struck down; and whether the Medicaid expansion
was unduly coercive.19 Most everyone watching this case, including legal
scholars, assumed that the individual mandate was the Achilles heel of the
Affordable Care Act.20 Thus, the Court’s June 28, 2012 decision caught
many by surprise.
In a plurality opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, the
Court held that while the individual mandate was a permissible use of
Congress’ taxing power,21 the Medicaid expansion was an
unconstitutionally coercive exercise of the Spending Clause.22 In its brief,
the National Federation of Independent Businesses—joined by a coalition
of twenty-six states23—argued that the mandatory expansion of Medicaid to
individuals living at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty line, when
combined with the ability of the federal government to withhold existing
Medicaid funding should a state fail to expand Medicaid eligibility, violated
the anti-compulsion principles of the Spending Clause.24 And, for the first
time in the history of American jurisprudence, a majority of the Supreme

16. See generally Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 29–34 (providing information of
the procedural posture regarding NFIB v. Sebelius).
17. Id.
18. Andrew Christy, ‘Obamacare’ Will Rank Among the Longest Supreme Court
Arguments Ever, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 15, 2011, 5:11 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
itsallpolitics/2011/11/15/142363047/obamacare-will-rank-among-the-longest-supremecourt-arguments-ever.
19. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2581 (2012).
20. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 3–4.
21. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601 (Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., Kagan J., and Breyer, J.
concurring).
22. Id. at 2606–07.
23. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d
1256, 1263 n.1 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (“The states are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.”).
24. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582.
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Court agreed.25 Importantly, the Court did not strike down the expansion
itself,26 though four justices would have.27 Instead, the Court prohibited the
federal government from placing existing Medicaid federal funding in
jeopardy should a state choose not to expand Medicaid.28 The practical
effect of this ruling was to make the Medicaid expansion optional for the
states.
Several aspects of this opinion are troubling, in particular, the way
that the Court contorted the practical realities of those living in poverty, as
well as the law, in order to reach the decision it did on the Medicaid
expansion.29 The Court’s determination that the Medicaid expansion was
unduly coercive relied, in part, on a finding that the Medicaid expansion
represented a new Medicaid program.30 In the words of Chief Justice
Roberts:
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in
kind, not merely degree. The original program was
designed to cover medical services for four particular
categories of needy: the disabled, the blind, the elderly, and
needy families with dependent children. . . . Under the
Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a
program to meet the health care needs of the entire
nonelderly population with income below 133 percent of
the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care for the
neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health
care coverage.31
As Chief Justice Roberts notes, until the passage of the Affordable
Care Act, the Medicaid program only recognized certain categories of
eligibility.32 These categories are artifacts of the Elizabethan poor laws, and
serve as codified evidence of society’s normative determinations about the
“deserving” and “undeserving” poor.33 In stating that those living under 133
percent of the federal poverty line do not qualify as “the neediest among
us,”34 Chief Justice Roberts contributes to this regrettable history rather
than unwinding it, ignoring the realities of millions of Americans living in
25. Id. at 2566, 2606–07, 2666 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J.,
dissenting).
26. Id. at 2607.
27. Id. at 2666 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 2607.
29. See id. at 2605–06.
30. See id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Huberfeld et al., supra note 2, at 13.
34. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–06 (joined by Breyer J., and Kagan, J.).
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poverty. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent, “Single adults earning no
more than $14,856 per year—133 percent of the current poverty level—
surely rank among the Nation’s poor.”35
Some of the legal analysis in NFIB v. Sebelius is also troubling.
The two legal questions at issue with respect to the Medicaid expansion
were: (1) whether congressional action taken pursuant to the Spending
Clause is subject to legally enforceable limits pursuant to the Tenth
Amendment; and (2) whether Congress exceeded those limits in passing the
Medicaid expansion.36 In his discussion, Chief Justice Roberts deftly
intermingles case law addressing the limits of the Commerce Clause with
that of the Spending Clause.37 In just a few paragraphs, two previously
distinct areas of the law were seamlessly married. This union enabled the
Court to create, for the first time ever, a limit on Congress’ authority to
regulate states under the Spending Clause.38 However, in uniting these two
areas of law, the Court gives little mind to the fundamental difference
between the Commerce Clause and the Spending Clause. The Commerce
Clause cases that the Court cited in the opinion essentially ask the question,
“To what extent can the federal government regulate the independent, nonfederally funded actions of the states?”39 In contrast, the cited case law in
Spending Clause litigation asks the question, “When the federal
government provides funding for a state program, what are the limits on the
federal government’s ability to regulate that state program?”40 It seems
intuitive that greater deference should be afforded to federal regulation
when the government is regulating a program receiving federal funds.41
However, in conflating these two areas of law, the opinion virtually ignores
this common sense understanding.42
Chief Justice Roberts does, however, note that this limitation only
applies to actions under the Spending Clause that create a situation where
the “[s]tate has no choice.”43 According to Chief Justice Roberts, the
35. Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 2602–04.
37. For example, a paragraph that begins with the statement, “At the same time, our
cases have recognized limits on Congress’s power under the Spending Clause,” contains
citations to both Spending Clause and Commerce Clause case law. Id. at 2602 (citing Barnes
v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (discussing Congress’ power under the Spending
Clause), Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (discussing
Congress’ power under the Spending Clause), and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,
156–60 (1992) (discussing Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause)).
38. Id. at 2630.
39. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at 156–60.
40. See, e.g., Barnes, 536 U.S. at 186; Penhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17.
41. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 101
(1989) (“In other words, the spending power is different from the commerce power relative
to the Tenth Amendment. . . . Even the seminal case creating the anti-commandeering
principle recognizes this distinction.”) (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 144).
42. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
43. Id. at 2603.
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Medicaid expansion falls into this “no choice” category because the
Medicaid program is so large and expensive and states have “developed
intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the course of many
decades to implement . . . Medicaid.”44 In other words, the actions of
Congress should be limited because the federal government has been too
generous and the states have become too reliant on this program. As Justice
Ginsberg asked, “[I]s it not passing strange to suggest that the purported
incursion on state sovereignty might have been averted, or at least
mitigated, had Congress offered the [s]tates less money to carry out the
same obligations?”45 Indeed, the Roberts opinion turns the logic of
cooperative federalism on its head.
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion discounts the very core of the
Medicaid system—cooperative federalism. Essentially, cooperative federal
programs exist because there are solutions to societal problems that states
cannot afford to address and there are particularized state issues that cannot
be fully accommodated by one-size-fits-all federal programs. Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion renders the federal strength the enemy of state flexibility,
instead of recognizing that they are both necessary components of
successful cooperative governance. Regardless, the impact of the Court’s
opinion is clear: the baton has been passed to the states.
PART II. PROVIDING HEALTH CARE TO THE POOR AND UNINSURED:
STATE OPTIONS REGARDING MEDICAID EXPANSION
After the Supreme Court’s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius, states
wishing to provide Medicaid coverage to ACA’s now statutorily defined
Medicaid population have two choices: (1) expand Medicaid in accordance
with the ACA or (2) apply for a 1115 waiver to administer a state plan.
Tennessee is opting for the second option. Part II of this Article contains
two sections to put Tennessee’s decision into context. Section A details the
1115 waiver option, specifically the limitations associated with these state
plan alternatives. Section B breaks down the status of the state decisions
regarding expansion at the time of this Article’s publication, including the
states choosing traditional expansion or an alternative state plan under
1115, as well as the states choosing to not expand their Medicaid programs.
A. Medicaid Law Governing State Plan Alternatives
As noted above, Medicaid is an example of cooperative
federalism.46 With respect to Medicaid, a state is allowed some flexibility in
shaping its program by choosing from various federally authorized options
44. Id. at 2604.
45. Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
46. See Wis. Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 495 (2002)
(stating that Medicaid “is designed to advance cooperative federalism.”).
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which policies to include in a state plan;47 however, the federal government
has established certain minimum benefits and protections that must be
provided should a state accept federal Medicaid funds.48 Section 1115 of
the Social Security Act49 provides a significant exception: States may apply
to receive waivers of specific federal Medicaid standards in order to
implement an “experimental, pilot, or demonstration project which, in the
judgment of the Secretary, is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of”
the Social Security Act.50
The statutory authority to conduct experimental demonstration
projects was added to the Social Security Act in 1962,51 and when the
Social Security Act was amended in 1965 to create the Medicaid program,
this waiver authority extended to this new federal health program.52
Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary is allowed to waive the
requirements spelled out in the United States Code.53 Thus, these 1115
waivers enable states, subject to the approval of the Secretary, to implement
broad changes to the structure of the Medicaid program. For example, in
1993, Tennessee received approval for a demonstration project that
transformed Tennessee’s Medicaid program from a traditional fee-forservice program into Medicaid managed care.54 The 1115 waiver is also the
mechanism through which Tennessee can pursue an alternative to the
Medicaid expansion.
Despite affording the states a great deal of flexibility, there are
several important limitations that govern the approval, review, and renewal
of 1115 waivers. Specifically, when reviewing a waiver proposal, the
Secretary must consider three important features of the proposed program.
First, the Secretary must consider whether the proposed project is truly
experimental.55 When Congress created this waiver authority, it specified
that the purpose of the authority is to “test out new ideas and ways of
dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients.”56 At the time of
enactment, Congress specified that the waivers were “expected to be

47. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) (2011).
48. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 (1985).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2011).
50. Id.
51. Wilbur J. Cohen & Robert M. Ball, Public Welfare Amendments of 1962 and
Proposals for Health Insurance for the Aged, 25 SOC. SEC. BULL. 3, 3 (1962), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v25n10/v25n10p3.pdf.
52. Social Security Amendments of 1965.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a).
54. See TennCare Overview, http://www.tn.gov/tenncare/news-about.shtml (last
visited Dec. 20, 2013); TennCare Timeline, http://www.tn.gov/tenncare/news-timeline.shtml
(last visited Dec. 20, 2013).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a); see also Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 380 (9th
Cir. 2011); Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994).
56. S. Res. 1589, 87th Cong. (1962) (enacted); see also H.R. Res. 1414, 87th Cong.
(1962) (enacted).
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selectively approved by the Department.”57 Read in concert, these
statements of congressional intent demonstrate that 1115 waivers were
intended to be a unique mechanism for testing unique programs. The import
of this limitation—that Section 1115 waivers must be used to test a novel,
experimental program—has also been recognized by the courts.58 For
example, in a case finding that the Secretary had exceeded the scope of her
approval authority, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[a] simple benefits cut,
which might save money, but has no research or experimental goal, would
not satisfy this requirement.”59
Second, the Secretary must make a determination that the proposed
project is “likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the Medicaid]
Act.”60 In other words, the projected outcomes of an experimental program
must serve the central goals of Medicaid. The goals of Medicaid are clearly
stated in the Social Security Act.61 The Medicaid program was designed
”to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled
individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to
meet the costs of necessary medical services, and (2)
rehabilitation and other services to help such families and
individuals attain or retain capability for independence or
self-care . . . .”62
With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, this list was expanded to
include single, childless adults living at or below 133 percent of the federal
poverty line.63
Third, the Secretary must make a determination regarding the
“extent and . . . period” necessary for the project.64 This language reflects
the congressional intent that these waivers should be not just limited in
frequency (thus the requirement that programs be unique), but also limited
in scope and duration.65 Though these requirements have since been
relaxed, past demonstration waivers were typically approved for a short

57. S. Res. 1589, 87th Cong. (1962) (enacted).
58. Beno, 30 F.3d at 1069.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
60. 42 U.S.C § 1315(a); see Grier v. Goetz, 402 F. Supp. 2d 876, 881 (M.D. Tenn.
2005) (noting that TennCare is a “special demonstration project authorized by the . . .
Secretary . . . pursuant to the waiver authority conferred by section 1115 of the Social
Security Act.”); see also Newton-Nations, 660 F.3d at 374; Beno, 30 F.3d at 1061.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 1396–1 (2011).
62. Id.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
64. 42 U.S.C § 1315(a); see also Newton-Nations, 660 F.3d at 380; Beno, 30 F.3d at
1061–71.
65. See 42 U.S.C § 1315(a).
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(three to five year), non-renewable term, and often were not statewide in
scope.66
Additionally, when a state has proposed a waiver from cost-sharing
requirements, the Secretary must evaluate the proposed plan under Section
1396o(f), an even more rigorous waiver evaluation standard.67 Cost-sharing
can be broadly defined as payments that must be made before medical
services can be obtained.68 Examples of cost-sharing include copayments,
coinsurance, and deductibles.69 The Social Security Act sets strict limits on
cost-sharing,70 but states may apply for waivers from these requirements.71
In contrast to the broader language of Section 1115 of the Social Security
Act, Section 1396o(f) details a highly circumscribed waiver authority for
cost sharing requirements.72 Pursuant to Section 1396o(f), cost sharing
programs proposed under Section 1115 must: (1) be approved by the
Secretary; (2) last no longer than two years; (3) test a unique and
“previously untested” use of cost-sharing; (4) provide benefits that are not
outweighed by risks to beneficiaries; (5) be based on a reasonable
hypothesis that will be tested in a “methodologically sound manner”; and
(6) be voluntary or contain provisions to address any damage to beneficiary
health as a result of mandatory participation.73
B. Current Status of State Decisions Regarding the Medicaid
Expansion
At the time of this publication, twenty-five states and the District of
Columbia are moving forward with the Medicaid expansion, nineteen are
not moving forward, and the debate is considered ongoing in six states,
including Tennessee.74 However, this breakdown is subject to additional
nuance. Three of the states that have been categorized as “moving forward
with an expansion” (Arkansas, Iowa, and Michigan) have pursued an
alternative means of expanding access to health care coverage.75
Additionally, in three states where the debate is considered ongoing
66. Jane Perkins, Fact Sheet: Federal Authority to Approve Medicaid Demonstration
Projects, NAT’L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM (July 2005), http://www.oregonadvocates.org/geo/
search/download.68462 (citing Memorandum from David Ellwood, Bruce Vladeck, and
Laurence Love, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., to U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs. Sec’y (June 22, 1993)).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(f) (2006).
68. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396o-1(a)(3) (2006).
69. See id.
70. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a); 42 C.F.R. §§ 447.51–.53 (2014).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(f).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, THE HENRY J.
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/state-activity-aroundexpanding-medicaid-under-the-affordable-care-act/#map (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
75. Id.
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(Indiana, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee), an alternative means of expansion
is considered the most likely route to expanded coverage.76 It is this
category—the alternative means of expanding coverage—that occupies the
central focus of this Article. Arkansas,77 Iowa,78 and Michigan79 have all
submitted formal proposals to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (“CMS”) for a demonstration project that creates some form of a
commercial insurance alternative, and these proposals were approved.80
Indiana81 and Pennsylvania82 have submitted proposals, but they have not
yet been approved by CMS.83 Tennessee, however, has not yet submitted a
formal proposal, but Governor Haslam has indicated to HHS Secretary
Kathleen Sebelius that the State would like to explore a commercial
insurance alternative, the Tennessee Plan.84 The details of the Tennessee
Plan—as sparse as they are—as well as the mechanism through which the
State will seek approval for this demonstration project, are explained at
greater length below.
PART III. THE TENNESSEE PLAN:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE MEDICAID EXPANSION
Central to the goal of the traditional Medicaid expansion is
covering those currently poor and uninsured individuals at or below 133
percent of the federal poverty line. While alternative state programs must
have this same end goal of providing health care to the expansion
population, the outcome of alternative, experimental programs will not
76. Id.
77. Arkansas Health Care Independence Program (Private Option), CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ar/ar-private-optionca.pdf; see also Arkansas 1115 Waiver Application, ARK. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., DIV. OF
MED. SERVS., https://www.medicaid.state.ar.us/Download/general/comment/
FinalHCIWApp.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
78. Iowa Marketplace Choice Plan Section 1115 Demonstration, CENTERS FOR
MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Dec. 30, 2013), http://www.medicaid.gov/MedicaidCHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Waivers/1115/downloads/ia/ia-marketplace-choiceplan-ca.pdf; see also Marketplace Choice Plan 1115 Waiver Application, IOWA DEP’T OF
HUMAN SERVS. (Aug. 2013), available at http://www.dhs.state.ia.us/uploads/
IAMktplaceChoice1115_Final.pdf.
79. Healthy Michigan Plan, MICH. DEP’T OF CMTY. HEALTH, http://www.michigan.
gov/mdch/0,4612,7-132-2941_4868_4897-299404--,00.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
80. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, supra note 74.
81. Healthy Indiana Plan 1115 Waiver Extension Application, IND. FAMILY AND SOC.
SERV. ADMIN. (Apr. 12, 2013), http://www.in.gov/aca/files/April122013HIPWaiver
ExtensionApp.pdf.
82. Draft Healthy Pennsylvania 1115 Demonstration Application, PA. DEP’T OF PUB.
WELFARE, (Dec. 2013), http://www.dpw.state.pa.us/ucmprd/groups/webcontent/documents/
document/p_039654.pdf.
83. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014, supra note 74.
84. Letter from Governor Bill Haslam to Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Apr. 1, 2013)
[hereinafter Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013] (on file with author).
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necessarily be the same as traditional programs because the means of an
alternative program differ from traditional expansion. The Tennessee Plan
in its current form may prove to be an example of this problem—potentially
causing harm to the State’s expansion population. Furthermore, regardless
of the potential effect of the Tennessee Plan, the State’s requests appear too
far afield from the central goals of Medicaid such that the Secretary would
deny certain portions or the entirety of the Tennessee Plan. Either partial or
full denial could prevent an enactment of an alternative program in
Tennessee; thus, the expansion population would be denied proper benefits.
For example, even if the Secretary strikes only certain provisions, the State
would be left with a plan that is considerably less flexible. The new
program may be too inflexible for the State to have sufficient support to
implement an alternative plan.
To analyze these problems, Part III contains four sections. Section
A provides an overview of the Tennessee Plan in its current form. Section B
addresses the sunset clause and payment reform in the Tennessee Plan.
Next, Section C analyzes the potential issues with certain Medicaid benefits
for the expansion population and provides recommendations for two
Medicaid benefits: early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment,
known as “EPSDT”; and non-emergency transportation. Finally, Section D
identifies two Medicaid protections in the Tennessee Plan—cost-sharing
and due process—that might be insufficient for the Secretary to approve of
their implementation.
A. Overview
In Tennessee, there are at least 161,500 individuals who would be
eligible for Medicaid if the State adopted coverage for the expansion
population.85 This sizable group of uninsured individuals includes
thousands of childless men and women, veterans, African-Americans, and
parents who can no longer claim their children as dependents, but are not
old enough to qualify for Medicare. Furthermore, approximately half of
Tennessee’s expansion population is among the working poor.86 In other
words, categorical eligibility has created large gaps in coverage, excluding
many Americans who are living in poverty, and these gaps are evident in
Tennessee. Despite Chief Justice Roberts’ assertions to the contrary, for the
hundreds of thousands of Tennesseans who are made more vulnerable by
poverty and lack of access to health insurance, the Medicaid expansion
would have touched those in our state who are “the neediest among us.”
On March 27, 2013, in an address to the Tennessee General
Assembly, Governor Bill Haslam announced that that in lieu of expanding
Medicaid eligibility as envisioned by the ACA, Tennessee would seek a
waiver to use federal Medicaid funds to provide premium subsidies to low
85. The Coverage Gap, supra note 1.
86. Id.
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income Tennesseans, enabling them to purchase private coverage on the
newly created health insurance marketplaces.87 In a letter to Secretary
Sebelius dated April 1, 2013, Governor Haslam briefly outlined his
proposed Tennessee Plan.88 Specifically, he requested the following
concessions from the federal government: (1) the ability to use Medicaid
expansion funding to purchase private plans for the expansion population
on the health insurance marketplace; (2) permission to treat the Medicaid
expansion population in the same manner as all others in the marketplace;
(3) waiver of Medicaid cost-sharing rules, which would enable the state to
impose cost sharing requirements on the expansion population that would
be the same as those levied against individuals in the marketplace who are
at 250 percent of the federal poverty line; (4) inclusion of a “circuit
breaker” or sunset clause that would automatically end the program when
federal funding declines; and (5) permission to implement provider
payment reforms.89
Essentially, the Tennessee Plan proposes using the federal
Medicaid expansion funds to provide premium assistance to individuals in
Tennessee who are currently not eligible for TennCare (the Tennessee
Medicaid program) and who are living at or below 133 percent of the
federal poverty line.90 If Tennessee had opted simply to expand Medicaid,
all individuals under 133 percent of the federal poverty line who are
currently not eligible for Medicaid would be able to get coverage through
TennCare.91 For this “expansion population” the federal funding (also
known as the federal match rate) would have been 100 percent for the first
three years.92 Under the proposed Tennessee Plan, the federal funds that
would have been used to provide a 100 percent match would now be
distributed to individuals in the expansion population through premium
subsidies.93 These individuals would use this premium assistance, which
would cover the full cost of an annual insurance payment, to enroll in
private insurance plans in the health insurance marketplace.94 Basically,
these premiums would operate as health insurance vouchers for individuals
in the expansion population.

87. Haslam Unveils ‘Tennessee Plan’ for Health Care Reform, TN.GOV (Mar. 27,
2013, 9:51 AM), https://news.tn.gov/node/10458.
88. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
92. As a means of comparison, Tennessee’s match rate for individuals who are
currently enrolled in Medicaid is roughly 66%, which means that for every two dollars that
the government contributes to Tennessee for its Medicaid program, Tennessee must match
this funding with a dollar of its own. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion
Decision, 2014, supra note 74.
93. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84.
94. Id.
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At a broad, conceptual level, this alternative approach is fairly
unobjectionable as federal funds will be used to provide coverage to those
who are currently uninsured, and thus—at first blush—though the means
may be different, the end is the same. Additionally, the political climate in
Tennessee is such that a public plan dressed in private plan clothes may be
the only way that a Medicaid expansion can happen in the State.95
However, as is often the case, the devil is in the details. The remainder of
this section will discuss the components of the Tennessee Plan, and where
necessary offer critiques and provide recommendations for moving
forward.
Before we break down the components of this request, a few
general comments about the framework are necessary. The way the
components are listed in the letter might suggest they bear equal weight and
significance, but this appearance is misleading. The first concession
requested by Governor Haslam would be the backbone of a Tennessee 1115
waiver proposal. The commercial insurance alternative to the Medicaid
expansion is the novel and experimental program that Tennessee would be
testing. The remaining requests, especially numbers two through four—
even if novel in their own right—are simply smaller components of a
commercial insurance alternative. The next section will briefly address the
larger concept of a private pay alternative and then provide a more detailed
discussion of the individual components of this alternative plan.
B. Sunset Clause and Payment Reform
The last two requests on the list submitted by Governor Haslam—a
circuit breaker and provider payment reforms—warrant less attention than
the other requested concessions, and for purposes of this Article, a brief
discussion will suffice. First, from a budgetary standpoint, Tennessee’s
request makes little sense, as the amount of federal funding that
accompanies a Medicaid expansion will likely create a budget surplus
beyond the first three years when the expansion is fully funded.96
Nevertheless, three years of coverage for the currently uninsured is better
than the alternative, which is absolutely no coverage for this population.
The sunset provision also complies with the requirement that 1115 waivers
be limited in duration.97 Accordingly, the inclusion of a sunset clause
should not be viewed as a barrier in the waiver approval process.

95. See Abby Rapoport, The Conservative Plan for Medicaid Expansion, THE AMER.
PROSPECT (Sept. 19, 2013) http://prospect.org/article/conservative-plan-medicaid-expansion.
96. Briefing Paper: TennCare/Medicaid Expansion, NASHVILLE AREA CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE (Feb. 5, 2013), http://nashvillepost.com/sites/default/files/attachments/
73215/2013%2002%20Chamber%20Medicaid%20expansion.pdf (describing additional
revenues that will result from expansion funding, including, inter alia, revenues from the
HMO tax).
97. 42 U.S.C § 1315(a).
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Second, although Tennessee’s proposal does not provide a great
deal of specificity with respect to payment reform, this lack of specificity
should not serve as barrier for waiver approval either. In his March 27
address before the Tennessee Legislature, Governor Haslam stated the
following: “During that period when our costs are covered 100 percent by
the federal government, we’d work with our medical care providers to
implement true payment reform. I am confident that working together, we
could truly reduce medical costs.”98 Tennessee has a long history with
provider payment reform. In fact, the State’s first 1115 waiver, which
created one of the first Medicaid managed care programs in the country,
was a dramatic and novel form of provider payment reform.99 With the
important caveat that provider payment reform should not impact the
quality of care provided to the beneficiary, this request is unobjectionable.
In fact, it is arguably aligned with the larger goals of the Affordable Care
Act,100 and, as implied by Governor Haslam’s letter to the Secretary, could
likely be done even absent an 1115 waiver.101
C. Medicaid Benefits
In his April 1, 2013 letter, Governor Haslam requested, inter alia,
approval from the Secretary for the following condition: “The Medicaid
Expansion group will be treated the same as others enrolled in the
[marketplace plans]. They will have access to the same benefits and appeals
process as all other enrollees in these plans.”102 Though this request might
appear innocuous and perhaps even “reasonable,”103 it threatens to
undermine the health care services available to a poor and vulnerable
population that is now a statutorily defined Medicaid population.104 The
Supreme Court’s decision did not strike down this eligibility category; it
simply removed the penalty that could be levied against states for their

98. Bill Haslam, Governor of Tenn., Remarks to the Tenn. General Assemb. (Mar. 27,
2013), https://news.tn.gov/sites/default/files/032713_Tennessee%27s_Plan_for_Health_
Care_Reform_-_As_Prepared.pdf [hereinafter Haslam Remarks].
99. Jean I. Thorne et al., State Perspectives on Health Care Reform: Oregon, Hawaii,
Tennessee and Rhode Island, 16 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 121, 121–38 (1995).
100. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148
§§ 3008(a) (124 Stat. 376–77), 3022 (124 Stat. 395–99), 3025(a) (124 Stat. 408–13)
(providing examples of provider payment initiatives included in the Act).
101. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84 (“In addition to the commitments we are
seeking from HHS, the Tennessee Plan includes reforming provider incentives and moving
toward a value-based purchasing system that will reward results and help control costs.”).
102. Id.
103. Haslam Remarks, supra note 98 (“All we’re asking from Washington is to allow
us to use the funds to provide coverage on the health care exchange in the same way many
other Tennesseans will access coverage whether or not we expand. It’s a reasonable ask
[sic].”).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(viii).
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failure to recognize this category.105 However, if a state accepts federal
funds for this eligibility category, or any other, that state must comply with
federal Medicaid law.106 Thus, individuals who are not otherwise eligible
for Medicaid and are living at or below 133 percent of the federal poverty
line are Medicaid beneficiaries, and are thus entitled to the full scope of
benefits and protections afforded to them under Medicaid law.
The Secretary has issued guidance to this effect.107 On March 29,
2013, as support for a commercial insurance alternative began to swell in
some states, the Secretary issued a short memo in the form of “Frequently
Asked Questions,” or “FAQs,” that provided guidance to states that were
working to develop alternative plans.108 This memo clearly states that
“beneficiaries remain Medicaid beneficiaries and continue to be entitled to
all benefits and cost sharing protections.”109 Further, the Secretary advised
that “[s]tates must have mechanisms in place to ‘wrap-around’ private
coverage to the extent that benefits are less and cost sharing requirements
are greater than those in Medicaid.”110 Having issued this guidance, the
Secretary is theoretically constrained from reversing course.111
Accordingly, states seeking approval of 1115 waivers for alternative
expansion plans should heed the guidance provided in the March 29
FAQs.112
Two Medicaid benefits in particular warrant additional
examination. Though descriptions of the Tennessee Plan have been notably
circumscribed, one can readily compare the mandatory benefits that must
be provided to all Medicaid beneficiaries with the essential health benefits
that are required for all plans sold on the marketplace.113 Two important
mandatory Medicaid services that would likely be excluded in the
Tennessee Plan’s waiver proposal are EPSDT and non-emergency
transportation. Our recommendations with respect to these services will be
addressed in turn below.
105. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
106. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 289.
107. Medicaid and the Affordable Care Act: Premium Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://medicaid.gov/Federal-Policy-Guidance/
Downloads/FAQ-03-29-13-Premium-Assistance.pdf.
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41
(1983) (citing § 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 414 (1971); Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 419
U.S. 281 (1974)) (noting that informal rules can be set aside only if “found to be ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law’”).
112. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 107.
113. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(1)–(5), (17), (21) and 42 C.F.R.
§ 431.53 (2012), with Tennessee–State Required Benefits, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Data-Resources/Downloads/tnstate-required-benefits.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
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1. EPSDT
The EPSDT requirements were incorporated into the Social
Security Act as part of the 1967 Social Security Act Amendments.114 The
program, which was recommended by President Lyndon Johnson, was
designed to meet the unmet medical needs of millions of America’s
children—unmet needs that were creating a population of unnecessarily
disabled adults.115 The broad, comprehensive, and mandatory requirements
of the EPSDT program116 have made it “the single most important public
policy effort ever undertaken to define an appropriate health services
coverage standard embedded in developmental pediatric practice.”117 As
one Tennessee court has described:
EPSDT covers a broad range of services. As the name
suggests, the purpose of EPSDT is to ensure that all
Medicaid-eligible children receive regular screening,
vision, hearing, dental and treatment services consistent
with established pediatric standards. The Federal Code
requires that the children receive ‘such other necessary
health care, diagnostic services, treatment and other
measures . . . to correct or ameliorate defects and physical
and mental illnesses under the State plan.’ 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(r)(5). The purpose of EPSDT is to ensure that
underserved children receive preventive health care and
follow-up treatment. EPSDT is premised on the idea that
early detection of problems will lead to treatment of minor
problems before they become major healthcare issues. By
preemptively screening, diagnosing and treating current
problems, EPSDT staves off larger healthcare problems in
the future, and ultimately results in a more efficient and
effective healthcare system with a proactive,
comprehensive, and long-term focus.118
As noted above, though health plans on the marketplace are
required to offer a core group of benefits,119 their coverage will not be as

114. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–248, 81 Stat. 821 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701–731, 1396d).
115. LYNDON JOHNSON, WELFARE OF CHILDREN, H.R. Doc. No. 90–54 (1st Sess. 1967).
116. See, e.g., John B. v. Menke, 176 F. Supp. 2d 786, 790 (M.D. Tenn. 2001).
117. Sarah Rosenbaum et al., EPSDT at Forty: Modernizing a Pediatric Health Policy
to Reflect a Changing Health Care System, 3 (July 2008), http://www.chcs.org/usr_doc/
EPSDT_at_40.pdf.
118. Id.
119. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 113.
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extensive as what is required by EPSDT.120 Approximately 750,000
children in Tennessee are eligible for EPSDT services through the
TennCare program.121 Thus, EPSDT is an enormously important program
for Tennessee’s children. An EPSDT waiver puts health of Tennessee’s
children in jeopardy, runs counter to the guidance provided by the
Secretary, and should not be a part of a Tennessee 1115 waiver application.
2. Non-emergency Transportation
Federal law requires state Medicaid programs to provide nonemergency transportation to certain qualified Medicaid enrollees—for
example, children and families who need transportation to access EPSDT
services.122 While transportation is not explicitly mentioned in the Social
Security Act, it is an administrative requirement created by the Secretary,123
which has the force of law.124 When the issue of transportation was raised
in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, that court
noted the following about sub-regulatory guidance that has been offered by
the Secretary about the transportation assurance regulation:
The Secretary of HHS has interpreted the application of the
transportation assurance regulation, which has the force of
law, in the Medical Assistance Manual (MAM). According
to the MAM, the transportation requirement is an integral
component of a statutory scheme whose aim is to further
the federal government’s commitment to ensure adequate
medical care for the needy. In the MAM, the Secretary
points out that ‘the Medicaid program has, from the
beginning (1966), encouraged [s]tates to arrange for
transportation for recipients to and from necessary medical
care.’ The regulation requiring the assurance of
transportation is ‘based on the recognition, from past
program operation experience, that unless needy
individuals can actually get to and from providers of

120. This disparity is significant for purposes of our argument, but historically
unremarkable. See Rosenbaum et al., supra note 117, at 1 (noting that EPSDT has
traditionally provided a more comprehensive benefits package than private insurance plans).
121. John B. v. Emkes, 852 F. Supp. 2d 957, 961 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
122. See 42 C.F.R. § 431.53 (2011).
123. See id.
124. Agency regulations have the “force and effect of law.” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 280, 295–96 (1979); see also Smith v. Vowell, 379 F. Supp. 139, 148 (W.D. Tex.
1974) (“[T]here can be no question as to the authority of the regulations promulgated” by the
agency regarding administration of the Medicaid program.), aff’d, 504 F.2d 759 (5th Cir.
1974).
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services, the entire goal of a [s]tate Medicaid program is
inhibited at the start.’125
As the language from the Secretary suggests, transportation is a
vital component of ensuring that low-income individuals can actually
access the care to which they are entitled. It is so vital in fact, that denying
transportation services would defeat “the entire goal of a [s]tate Medicaid
program.”126 Section 1115 waivers must, as a matter of federal law, be used
to test programs that promote the objectives of the Medicaid program.127 It
is difficult to imagine what experimental value a denial of transportation
services could provide and such a denial is clearly at odds with the goals of
Medicaid. Accordingly, such a waiver request would be detrimental to
Tennessee citizens, is likely to be denied by the Secretary, and should not
be included in a Tennessee 1115 waiver proposal.
D. Medicaid Protections
The Tennessee Plan must incorporate adequate protections of the
expansion population for the Secretary to approve its program. Two areas
of the Tennessee Plan in particular raise possible problems. The first
subsection identifies economic inequalities in the cost-sharing program as
well as the burden of the State to demonstrate the novelty of the costsharing program. The second subsection addresses the due process of
Medicaid beneficiaries and the necessary considerations an alternative plan
must contemplate.
1. Cost-Sharing
In his March 29, 2013 speech, Governor Haslam intimated that he
would request waiver approval from the Secretary for cost-sharing
provisions that would—absent a waiver—conflict with federal law. At the
time, he listed this request as a potential barrier to an agreement between
HHS and the State of Tennessee:
HHS says we have to provide additional benefits, above
and beyond what everyone else in the exchange will
receive. We’ll also have to follow certain Medicaid-driven
guidelines when it comes to co-pays and the appeals
125. Daniels v. Tenn. Dep’t of Health & Env’t, No. 79–3107, 1985 WL 56553, at *2
(M.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 1985) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Vowell, 379 F. Supp. at 148; Fant
v. Stumbo, 552 F. Supp. 617, 619 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (finding that “any regulation which
seeks to limit transportation for necessary medical treatment is contrary to the federal
statutes and regulations and is thus invalid”).
126. Daniels, 1985 WL 56553, at *2.
127. 42 U.S.C § 1315(a).
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process instead of allowing these individuals to be treated
like everyone else in private insurance plans.128
Nevertheless, this request appeared in the list of concessions
mentioned in the State’s April 1 letter.129 Specifically, Governor Haslam
requested permission to implement “[c]ost sharing requirements for the
Medicaid Expansion group [that] will be the same as other enrollees in the
market place with incomes below 250 percent of poverty.”130 The Governor
stated that his cost-sharing plan is designed to ensure that “the user has
some skin in the game when it comes to health care incentives.”131
As described above, the Social Security Act imposes additional,
more stringent requirements on proposals seeking waiver of federal costsharing limitations.132 Though the nuances of federal cost-sharing
requirements are beyond the scope of this Article, in broad terms only
“nominal” co-pays can be assessed against the categorically needy,133 which
now includes the expansion population, and several categories and services
are excluded from deductibles, co-pays, and other payments, including
pregnancy-related services134 and treatment provided to children pursuant to
EPSDT.135
From an economic perspective, this request makes little sense. It
would impose co-pays on individuals making between zero and $15,281.70
per year at the same levels as those making at least twice as much,
$28,725.136 Given the high cost of the co-pays (equal to those levied against
individuals at 250 percent of the federal poverty line), it is unlikely that this
program could provide “benefits that aren’t outweighed by risks to
beneficiaries.”137 Additionally, as noted above, “[a] simple benefits cut,
which might save money, but has no research or experimental goal, would
not satisfy this requirement.”138 Though more details may emerge,
Governor Haslam’s stated justification seems unlikely to satisfy the
128. Haslam Remarks, supra note 98.
129. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84.
130. Id.
131. Haslam Remarks, supra note 98.
132. In order for a waiver of these requirements to be approved, a state must
demonstrate to the Secretary, inter alia, that its cost-sharing program (1) tests a unique and
“previously untested” use of cost-sharing; (2) provides benefits that are not outweighed by
risks to beneficiaries; (3) is based on a reasonable hypothesis that will be tested in a
“methodologically sound manner”; and (4) is voluntary or contains provisions to address any
damage to beneficiary health as a result of mandatory participation. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(f).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53 (2011).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)(2)(B); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53(b)(2).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(a)(2)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 447.53(b)(1).
136. 2013 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://
www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Topics/Eligibility/
Downloads/2013-Federal-Poverty-level-charts.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2014).
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1396o(f).
138. Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1069 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
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requirement that a cost-sharing program has research or experimental value.
Additionally, as one court has noted, “[O]ver the last [thirty-five] years, a
number of studies have looked at the effects of cost sharing on the poor. Of
all forms of cost sharing, copayments are the most heavily studied.”139
Because “new” cost-sharing approaches have been tried for over thirty-five
years, at this point it is hard to imagine a novel program that would have
true experimental value. Further, the body of research that has emerged
from these experimental projects demonstrates that cost-sharing is an
ineffective and detrimental way to manage care for low-income patients,140
which would make it difficult for Tennessee to demonstrate that this costsharing was not detrimental to enrollees.
Given both the economic inequity of the cost-sharing program
proposed and the challenge of proposing a cost-sharing program that will
test out a novel approach for managing health care delivery to low-income
beneficiaries, the Secretary would be constrained in her ability to approve
the program proposed by Governor Haslam.
2. Due Process
In his speech before the legislature, Governor Haslam also
indicated that the Tennessee Plan would require a waiver of due process
protections afforded to Medicaid beneficiaries.141 This request was repeated
in his April 1, 2013 letter.142
The due process rights of Medicaid beneficiaries are rooted in the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution143 and reinforced by
the statutory language of the Social Security Act.144 The breadth of these
protections was given shape in the landmark case, Goldberg v. Kelly.145
Under Goldberg, “when welfare is discontinued, only a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing provides the recipient with procedural due process.”146
This pre-termination hearing must take place before an impartial decision
139. Newton-Nations v. Betlach, 660 F.3d 370, 381 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting the
plaintiff’s public health expert’s statement); see, e.g., Robert H. Brook et. al, The Effect of
Coinsurance on the Health of Adults, (Dec. 1984), available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/reports/2006/R3055.pdf.
140. Joseph P. Newhouse, Consumer-Directed Health Plans and the RAND Health
Insurance Experiment, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 107, 109–10 (Nov. 2004), http://content.health
affairs.org/content/23/6/107.full.pdf (highlighting the RAND finding that co-payments were
harmful to the poor and sick).
141. Haslam Remarks, supra note 98.
142. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (requiring state plans to “provide for granting an
opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for
medical assistance under the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable
promptness”).
145. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
146. Id. at 264.

2014]

MEDICAID EXPANSION

141

maker147 after timely notice of the denial148 and provide, inter alia, the
opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses and have representation by
an attorney, if the beneficiary so chooses.149
In his letter to the Secretary, Governor Haslam requested
permission to go forward with a waiver application that included a proposal
that would treat the Medicaid expansion population “the same as all others
enrolled in the [marketplace;] [t]hey will have access to the same . . .
appeals process as all other enrollees in these plans.”150 Though it is unclear
what appeal procedures will be available in the marketplace, the Governor’s
intent to seek a waiver to substitute those marketplace appeal procedures
implies that they will be less robust than Medicaid’s procedures, since a
waiver would only be required if the Tennessee Plan offered less protection
to enrollees. Recall, however, that the scope of the Secretary’s waiver
authority is limited. Though, as noted above, Section 1396(a) does include
language about notice and a fair hearing, this is a supplement to—not
independent of—the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.
And, while the Secretary has authority to waive Section 1396(a) provisions,
the Secretary cannot waive the Constitution; doing so would exceed the
scope of her authority and subject a waiver program to judicial challenge.
Accordingly, Tennessee, and other states considering an alternative to the
Medicaid expansion must afford these categorically defined Medicaid
beneficiaries with the full scope of due process protections as required by
Goldberg and the United States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
By rendering the Medicaid expansion optional, the Supreme Court
placed on the states the responsibility for addressing an enormous and
inequitable hole in one of this country’s most important safety net
programs. In his lead opinion, Chief Justice Roberts likened the ACA’s
Medicaid expansion requirement to the federal government telling a state:
“your money or your life.”151 Setting aside any disagreement with this
characterization, it is clear that even if this premise can be accepted, the
pendulum has swung too far in the other direction. If the proposals that
147. Id. at 271.
148. Id. at 267–69.
149. Id. at 269–70.
150. Haslam Letter, Apr. 2013, supra note 84.
151. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 n.12 (2012). The use of the metaphor in
the service of a ruling that has the effect of denying Medicaid coverage to the uninsured poor
is tragically ironic. A well-documented deficiency of the American health care system that
Medicaid expansion would address is the large number of Americans that cannot afford
health coverage. For these unfortunate millions, “your money or your life” is a lived reality,
not a rhetorical flourish. The Institute of Medicine places the number of preventable deaths
among the uninsured, due to their inability to afford timely medical care, at 18,000 per year.
COMMITTEE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF UNINSURANCE, INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, CARE
WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 163 (2002).
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have been presented to the Secretary—both the letter sent from Governor
Haslam, and the formal proposals offered by Iowa and Arkansas—are any
indication, several aspects of these alternative plans threaten to undermine
the central goals of Medicaid, the fundamental purpose of the Section 1115
waiver program, and the spirit of cooperative federalism.
Tennessee is faced with the opportunity to right the inequity of
archaic categorical Medicaid eligibility categories and provide coverage to
over 160,000 uninsured Tennesseans.152 This opportunity comes with an
unprecedented level of federal funding and a demonstrated willingness
from the Secretary to consider experimental programs. To shift the
pendulum back to center and ensure that expanded access to care can
happen in Tennessee, the State must act in a manner that respects the shared
goal of providing for the general welfare of Tennesseans. In short, it must
cooperate.

152. The Coverage Gap, supra note 1, at 5.

